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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and main result
In 2003, the European Commission enacted legislation allowing antitrust breaches to be
prosecuted through national and European courts. Private parties now have the possibil-
ity to sue for damages and for injunctions against violations of competition law and thus
are able to initiate antitrust proceedings. Previously, only antitrust authorities were able
to impose a ne or declare a given behavior to be in breach of antitrust laws.1 This policy
change has aligned European enforcement practice with that of the United States,2 where
trials led by private parties are the most common form of prosecution.3 As this legal
reform has the potential to fundamentally change enforcement practice, it has naturally
triggered a wave of research on its economic eects.
One argument identied by a number of researchers is that with supplementary private en-
forcement, the number of unprosecuted anticompetitive actions (type II errors) decreases;
however, this occurs at the cost of an increase in false prosecutions (type I errors). The
ideas behind this theory are simple and identical for the two error types. If the antitrust
authority (henceforth AA) fails to prosecute an antitrust breach, the option for private
enforcement introduces a second chance for prosecution, namely through judicial decree in
the private suit. Similarly, even if the courts correctly choose to not prosecute a procom-
petitive action, the possibility of private trial entails a second risk for false prosecution.
McAfee et al. (2008) and Calcagno (2012) examine this argument in formal models. Both
start from the assumption that there is some private party eligible for payment of dam-
ages, and that this party is perfectly informed about the antitrust violation, while the AA
receives only an imperfect signal regarding the competitive nature of the oending rm's
action. The objective of private trial enforcement is to utilize this information about the
legality of an action possessed by the injured party. They further assume that a private
trial is the only channel through which this private information can be exploited in an-
titrust enforcement. However, this simplication does not represent the actual way in
which antitrust institutions operate, as communication between injured parties and the
AA in connection with standard investigation seems to be a common feature in enforce-
ment practice.
We investigate the consequences of private trials on enforcement ecacy, taking into ac-
count the fact that private parties have the possibility to report breaches of competition
law to the AA. The fact that AAs rely on and act upon the revelation of information
by third parties is well documented. For instance, Harrington (2006) discusses the steps
1However, the judicial system played an important role in antitrust enforcement, as a prosecuted rm
had the right to appeal administrative convictions in the Court of First Instance.
2An important remaining dierence between American and European enforcement institutions is that
the antitrust authority in the US cannot itself apply nes, but must bring the case to trial, just as a
private party does. See Ganglmair and Guenster (2011) for a technical analysis of the eects resulting
from this institutional dierence.
3Segal and Whinston (2006) report that in the US about 90% of all antitrust trials are initiated by private
parties.
2of antitrust enforcement procedures, concluding that the AA plays almost no role in the
detection of antitrust violations, but rather investigates and prosecutes based upon initial
evidence provided by outside parties. Hay and Kelley (1974) nd that in only two out of
49 price-xing cases did the Department of Justice (the American competition authority)
initiate an investigation without any external informant reporting the infringement. The
possibility of external complaint is also formalized in EC Regulation 01/2003 Article 7,
which species that any party with a legitimate interest can demand that the AA initiates
a formal investigation.4 This paper addresses the highly topical matter of the enforcement
eects of private trials in the light of private incentives to present evidence to the AA.
Our study establishes that allowing private trials does not necessarily decrease the chance
that guilty rms will go undetected (i.e., lower the probability of type II errors); this nding
contradicts previous literature. In an additional contrast to the established argument, we
show that private trials may in fact decrease (increase) the deterrence of anticompetitive
(procompetitive) actions. For an intuitive illustration, consider the case of anticompeti-
tive actions. If the injured rm has the possibility to sue, it might no longer be willing to
cooperate with the AA, since by bringing suit it can both enforce the injunction as well
as secure payment for damages. Thus, going to trial and reporting evidence to the AA
are substitutable. However, under the assumption that the court will be more likely to
make an error than the AA, reporting would be superior from a social point of view, be-
cause the strength of the private party (initial evidence) is combined with the investigative
powers of the authority (as Harrington 2006 argues). The rm considers the possibility
that the AA will initiate proceedings even without the rm's evidence, in which case the
rm could save on evidence production costs. Consequently, reporting has a higher social
value than suing but is relatively undervalued by the rm, due to the potential expenses
in trial, which are wasted if the authority has already established its verdict. With both
enforcement channels, the injured party can wait and see whether the AA will act alone,
but suing has the advantage that the expenses cannot ex-ante be wasted. Shavell (1997)
describes how underenforcement results from a misalignment of the private and public
incentives to litigate. In our model, private trials have a positive direct eect, increasing
the level of law enforcement; however, at the same time they crowd out a superior method
of law enforcement. If the indirect eect dominates the direct eect, the result that private
trials will increase the likelihood of prosecution will be reversed. The situation with regard
to the decrease in deterrence resulting from the possibility of private trials is completely
analogous. By the same argument, the possibility of private trials can deter injured parties
from reporting frivolous evidence of procompetitive actions to the AA. Here, however, if
the court is less capable than the AA of distinguishing procompetitive from anticompeti-
tive behavior, then the introduction of private trials cannot decrease the number of type I
errors, even if a private party will only report when trials are not possible. The resulting
4If the AA refuses to investigate the complaint, the complaining party can seek judicial review and
might become eligible for damage payments against the Commission if the case is found to have been
wrongfully dismissed. See Albors-Llorens (2002).
3eect on deterrence can be reversed, such that more procompetitive behavior is deterred
when private trials are not an option.
The objective of our model is to isolate the enforcement eect of higher probability of pros-
ecution resulting from the information advantage of private parties. In order to accomplish
this most eectively, we abstract from the reality that the level of payments following a
public conviction diers between regimes. Private suits can follow up on a public con-
viction, whereby deterrence is increased through the additional damage payment. Wils
(2003) argues, however, that this deterrent eect can alternatively be achieved directly by
increasing the criminal ne. To exclude this enforcement eect (which does not contribute
beyond the arguments of Becker (1968)), we allow an injured rm to sue for damages in
both legal setting; however, in the restrictive setting (referred to hereafter as the no-trial
setting), suit is only permitted if the breach has already been administratively established
by the AA (so-called follow-up suits). Although this is not a comparison of the previous
and current European legal system, it oers much more interesting juxtaposition, as it
identies the pure enforcement eect resulting from the exploitation of information held
by private parties.
Methodologically, our model augments the standard analysis by introducing a dynamic
structure. Previous models assumed one-shot deviations and one-time prosecution possi-
bilities. We consider a repeated game, in which an action can be taken and prosecution
is possible in each period. The game only ends when either public or private prosecution
determines the legality or illegality of an action. This also allows us to clearly distinguish
between deterrence and desistance of antitrust violations in the private enforcement con-
text, as it is common in the broader literature on antitrust enforcement (e.g., the analysis
of leniency programs).
1.2 Literature review
The enforcement of laws has been a documented interest of economic scholars since Becker
(1968). A survey on private antitrust enforcement is provided by Segal and Whinston
(2006). We build directly upon the research of McAfee et al. (2008) and Calcagno (2012),
who demonstrate that the information advantage of a third party, that can be exploited
in private trial has the eect of decreasing type II errors, but increasing type I errors. An
alternate mechanism of private enforcement has been suggested by Martini and Rovesti
(2004). They identify an underenforcement problem of pure public enforcement, which
may be overcome by delegating enforcement to a private party. This party does not
consider nes as welfare-neutral and thus investigates more intensively than a welfare-
maximizing AA. Their model is conceptually dierent than ours, as they are interested in
the question of private enforcement as a replacement for public enforcement, rather than
as a complementary system. The eect of the private trial option on public enforcement
in connection to information spillovers is considered by Bourjade et al. (2009) and Briggs
et al. (1996); however, they do not consider the fact that private parties also play a role in
4public prosecution. Silbye (2012) argues that private trials can have a negative impact on
public prosecution, specically for leniency programs, because the incentive to self-report
decreases when private trial is possible. From a practitioner's perspective, Wils (2003,
2009) does not see any need for private suits as a means to increase enforcement eciency;5
instead, he highlights the importance of strengthening the collaboration between private
parties and the AA in European enforcement practice.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The model is introduced in Section 2;
subsequently, we derive the conditions, under which the injured rm will report its evidence
to the AA only if it cannot sue privately. In Section 3, it is shown that the decrease in
reporting resulting from the trial possibility might dominate additional enforcement eects
from trials against anticompetitive action, culminating in fewer prosecuted violations.
Analogously, in Section 4, we demonstrate that for procompetitive actions, the result can
only be reversed for deterrence but not for desistance, even when reporting is crowded out
and the AA commits fewer errors. Both Sections 3 and 4 include numerical examples to
illustrate that the novel eects are likely to occur for realistic parameter constellations and




At the beginning of the game, nature oers rm 1 one of two choices sets, the starting
points of two independent subgames. In the rst subgame, rm 1 has the choice to behave
anticompetitively or do nothing; in the second subgame, it chooses whether to behave pro-
competitively or do nothing. The entire subgame (including the trial possibility) following
the determination of the anticompetitive choice set is depicted in Figure 1. The game
tree of the subgame with the procompetitive action is analogous, with appropriately ad-
justed payos and probabilities at the moves of nature. Each of the subgames has several
stages as described below. We consider a dynamic setup, in which the subgame is played
repeatedly, until certain end notes are reached, at which point the game can be altered or
terminated.
Stage 0. Firm 1 decides whether to undertake the oered action. If the action is not
performed the game ends.
Stage I. Once rm 1 has decided to undertake the action, the AA will investigate
the action with exogenous probability 0 <  < 1. The probability of investigation is
larger than zero and smaller than one, as the AA can screen some industries but cannot
screen all industries because of a budget constraint. An anticompetitive action is con-
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Figure 1: The subgame of anticompetitive actions
victed with probability (1 ) and a procompetitive action with probability .6 The fact
that antitrust authorities and courts make erroneous decisions has already been observed
by Posner (1976). In an empirical study, Duso et al. (2007) nd that about 20%-25% of
all merger decisions made by the European Commission are erroneous. Thus,  denotes
the error probability for the two types of actions and is assumed to be identical for both
types of errors.7 If the action was successfully prosecuted by the AA, the game ends and
is not repeated, corresponding to perfect desistance following a conviction. Furthermore,
we assume that an acquittal precludes any future possibility of either public prosecution
6We follow the common assumption that the probability of investigation and conviction are exogenously
given. This approach was has also been used by Calcagno (2012). McAfee et al. (2008) assume instead
that the authority is an active welfare-maximizing player. This approach is incompatible with payos
determined by gains from the action and the ne, since then the AA would never intervene as nes are
ex-post welfare-neutral. Rather, they assume that all payos are reset to zero after an AA ruling. This
would be not compatible with some of our arguments, as they rely on the fact that prosecution by the
AA and private trial imply dierent payos.
7See Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) for a discussion of symmetric error probabilities.
6or private trial. Firm 1 can continue to take the action in later periods without any risk
of conviction.
Stage II. If rm 1 was not convicted in Stage I, rm 2 has the possibility to report
information to the AA that can start an investigation. However, rm 2 cannot perfectly
determine whether the AA did in Stage I not investigate the action or decided not to pros-
ecute it. It learns of an acquittal following an investigation only with probability  and
can otherwise not distinguish acquittals from non-investigations. Prosecution, however, is
perfectly observed. In practice, enforcement authorities sometimes publish investigations
that did not lead to a prosecution. However, this gives only an imperfect signal of the
AA's activity and of how it will respond to further evidence in a given industry.8 If the
AA has not previously investigated the action, the report will induce the AA to investigate
with probability 0 <  < 1. Again, investigations are subject to error probability . If
the AA investigated and acquitted rm 1 in Stage I, it will ignore the newly provided
evidence. Thus, the private rm can induce the AA to investigate a case, but not to err or
correct a previous error. These assumptions about the behavior of the AA are consistent
with the above mentioned arguments made by Harrington (2006): Private parties help
the AA to detect illegal activities, but the conviction probability once investigation has
begun is not inuenced by third parties, since the AA has more investigative power (e.g.,
dawn raids) than private parties do.9 Again, prosecution ends the game, while acquittal
precludes both public and private prosecution in the future.
Stage III. Depending on the status of the legal system, if the AA did not carry out an
investigation, rm 2 might now have the possibility to privately litigate against rm 1 for
damages (in the trial setting). If the AA investigated but found rm 1 not guilty, private
trial is impossible, as I assume that the court will never reverse an administrative decision.
This requires in turn that rm 2 is at the beginning of the trial, opposed to the Stage II,
where it chooses whether to report, informed about the reason for non-conviction through
the AA. We thus assume that at the beginning of the trial it is public knowledge, whether
the AA carried out an investigation or not. This reects the fact that most legal systems
have an admissibility test before a trial starts protecting the plainti from pursuing cases
it cannot win (e.g., for formal reasons). The private rm wins the stand-alone case with
probability 1  for anticompetitive actions and with probability  for procompetitive
actions. We interpret  as the error probability of the court (analogous to the error
probabilities of the AA) and assume that the courts are more prone to err than the AA,
8Another reason for imperfect recognition could be that the AA publishes the results of failed investiga-
tions strategically; see Sauvagnat (2010).
9Note that we assume that rm 2 knows ex-ante whether the action of rm 1 breached antitrust laws or
not. This information structure is the usual justication for private enforcement and hence the starting
point of this model. The rm's activity is to generate evidence and to provide it to the AA, not to
nd out whether the action is a violation. Firm 2 can thus provide truthful evidence in the case of an
anticompetitive action, or it can manipulate the AA to investigate a procompetitive action resulting in
a ne on an innocent rm, just as it can bring about both legitimate and frivolous lawsuits.
7that is,  > 1. The factor  can be interpreted as a measure of the ability of the AA to
correctly interpret economic evidence relative to the ability of a judge. As with public
prosecution, private conviction ends the game and acquittal precludes any future convic-
tion. If no investigation was carried out and there was no private trial, the subgame is
repeated in identical form.
Payos. If the action was not undertaken by rm 1 all payos are zero. Both the
anticompetitive and the procompetitive action generate a per-period prot  for rm 1
and a damage D for rm 2. The damage is fully recuperated by rm 2 if either public
prosecution or private trial is successful.10 In the rst case, we implicitly assume that a
follow-up case after a public conviction will be won by rm 2 with certainty. A public
conviction additionally leads to a ne of size D for rm 1, where  denotes the size of the
ne relative to the damage payment. Reporting information to the AA comes at cost cD
for rm 2.11 Total litigation costs are assumed to be a multiple of the reporting cost cD,
with  > 1. We further assume that litigation costs are borne according to the British
rule; that is, the losing party must pay the expenses of both parties as well as legal fees,
but evidence production cost cannot be shifted to the losing party.12
Either a public or a private conviction will prevent rm 1 from continuing the action in all
following periods. The game ends and all payos will be zero in all future periods. This
is a common assumption in the literature and reects the idea that the AA very closely
monitors industries with recent convictions and is perfectly able to recognize violations
without any cost. Indeed, Bosch and Eckard (1991) have shown that the number of re-
peated infringements is very low. There is also some evidence that private trials have a
strong desistance eect. In a stock market event study Bizjak and Coles (1995) have shown
that the loss of market value for a rm convicted in a private antitrust trial is much greater
than the loss that would be justied by the monetary payment. The authors conclude
that a large part of the loss occurs due to the impossibility of continuing the protable
action, which is well captured in our model by the assumption that a successful convic-
tion also creates quasi-payments from rm 1 to rm 2 in all periods. However, private
and public prosecution have dierent legal consequences in terms of damage payments. A
public prosecution leads to both a ne and the private damage payment, whereas after a
private conviction the AA does not follow up with a ne.
Finally, if neither public nor private prosecution occurs, the drawn subgame is repeated;
in Figure 1, this corresponds to the payos indicated with a star. Payos are aected by
a common discount factor, given by  < 1.
To summarize, the decisions for rm 2 are in each subgame (i) whether or not to provide
10European enforcement design rules out treble damages.
11To simplify notation, we dene all payos of rm 2 relative to the damage payment D.
12This is the legal standard in most European jurisdictions. In our model the British rule increases the
parameter ranges of the identied eects; however it is by no means a necessary requirement for the
eects to arise.
8evidence to the AA at Stage I and (ii) whether or not to sue at Stage II. If the rm reports
information to the AA, the chance of public prosecution increases and the increase in
expenses and error rate of a private trial can be avoided. However, reporting can be
wasteful from rm 2's perspective, since the AA might already have investigated and
concluded that rm 1 is innocent and will not carry out any further investigations. Firm
1 must only decide whether it should undertake the oered actions or not, after taking
the enforcement probabilities associated with reporting and suing into consideration.
Note that providing information to the AA and ling suit have dierent consequences
for the expected payos of rm 2. Reporting information on the one hand leads to a
lower error probability but does not ensure that the action will be investigated in the
same period. On the other hand, trial increases the error probability but ensures that the
decision will be made in the given period. This seems reasonable as the AA is very eective
at gathering and evaluating economic evidence on potential breaches of competition law,
but is unskilled at detecting violations. In contrast, the court is obliged to investigate
when a private party les suit, but has much less economic knowledge and thus has a
harder time dierentiating between procompetitive and anticompetitive actions.
2.2 Trials and the incentives to report
In this section we show that the incentive to report information on both types of actions
can decrease when stand-alone private trials are possible. Introducing the option of pri-
vate trials creates dierent eects on the incentives to report. The intuitive reason for
not providing information is that under the trials regime, the returns on investment for
reporting are lower, as both the desistance in future periods and the damage payment
can also be achieved through the private trial. Enforcement through the courts is more
expensive for rm 2 than reporting, but can still crowd out reporting, as there is a positive
probability that the AA will neglect reported evidence altogether (wasting the reporting
cost) because the agency already took an earlier decision that was unobserved by rm
2. However, trials can also crowd in reporting if courts have a high (low) probability of
committing an error in the anticompetitive (procompetitive) case, as this error cannot
be corrected later. Consequently, rm 2 will try to prevent a court decision, as it would
preclude future chances of prosecution by the AA.
We derive conditions under which rm 2 will report information to the AA on both pro-
and anticompetitive actions in the no-trials setting only, as only this allows a potential
increase in the number of type II errors and a potential decrease in the number of type I
errors through the introduction of private trials.
2.2.1 Anticompetitive actions
Assume that rm 2 knows that rm 1 violated the antitrust law. It must then decide
whether to gather and provide evidence to the AA by comparing the gain resulting from
a higher chance of investigation and thus desistance against the cost of reporting. If
9stand-alone trials are not possible, rm 2 will report whenever the cost of reporting is
lower than the expected additional gain if the action is halted. In addition to the damage
payment (which can be obtained in both the trial and the non-trial setting), successful
prosecution creates quasi-payos of size D in all future periods for rm 2, as the action will
not be continued by court order. If the actions are not investigated in the current period,
there will be the identical probability for the actions to be investigated and prosecuted in
the following period.13 The ex-ante expected value of a reporting strategy (denoted by
subscript R) in the subgame of the anticompetitive action (denoted by superscript AC)
in no-trial setting (denoted by subscript NT) is given by the following recursive equation:
V AC
NT;R =
((1   ) + )(1   ) D
1    ((1   ) + (1   ))cD
1   (1   )(1   )
: (1)
Firm 2 expects to gain a damage payment of D and a quasi-payo of the same size in all
future periods (because of the desistance) if the AA prosecutes, either alone or using the
reported information. However, rm 2 must pay reporting costs when it believes (possibly
incorrectly) that the AA has no investigated the action and submits a report. If (even on
the basis of reported information) the AA does not investigate the action, desistance is
still possible in future periods. Similarly, the ex-ante expected value of the entire subgame
for not reporting (denoted with subscript NR) is given by
V AC
NT;NR =
(1   ) D
1 
1   (1   )
: (2)
The decision of whether to report must only be taken by rm 2 at Stage II of the subgame
after the AA did not successfully prosecute rm 1 alone and rm 2 did not observe a failed
prosecution, which occurs with probability (1 )+(1 ). The cost of reporting must
be borne independent of the reason for non-conviction (i.e., failed prosecution or lack of
prosecution), but prosecution at Stage II is only possible if the AA has not previously
investigated the action. Firm 2 constructs its belief according to Bayes' rule; thus, the
expected payos of conviction, either in this or in later periods, must be discounted with
(1   )
1    + (1   )
; (3)
which is the probability that the AA did not investigate the action, given that non-
prosecution was observed by rm 2 (left node of the information set at stage II of Figure
1). Comparing the payos, reporting is the dominant strategy only if
(1   )














since whenever reporting is optimal in the given period, it will also be optimal in all
13Frezal (2006) reports that non-stationary investigation probabilities might be a better enforcement strat-
egy for the AA.
10future periods. This is equivalent to
c 
(1   )(1   )
(1    + (1   ))(1   (1   ))
 cAC
NT: (5)
Now consider the case, in which private stand-alone trials for damages are allowed.
This condition additionally incorporates the expected payo and costs from a private
trial, which is ex-ante only necessary with probability (1  ) (when rm 2 did not report
to the AA) or (1   )(1   ) (when rm 2 did report to the AA). If rm 2 goes to trial,
there must be a (stochastic) decision by either the authority or the court, precluding any
chance of prosecution in future periods if it is though investigation unsuccessful in the
given period. For this reason, is it unnecessary to dene the values of reporting and not-
reporting strategies recursively as in the trial setting.
Assume for the moment that rm 2 goes to trial whenever it is allowed to do so. Then in
the trial setting, it will report information to the AA if14
(1   )
























(1   )(   1)
(1   )((1   )(1   ) + (1   ))
 cAC
T ; (7)
where we assume for the moment that the denominator is positive. For a negative
denominator reporting would always be optimal in the trial condition; this would render
our analysis void, as we are looking for parameter constellations under which rm 2 does
not report in the trials setting. We will show later that this constraint is non-binding.
Firm 2 must also report in the no-trial setting; consequently we seek the conditions for
the existence of an interval [cAC
T ;cAC




  1 +
(1   )(1   )((1   )(1   ) + (1   ))




which imposes, due to the restriction  > 1, the requirement
 <
1    + (1   )
(1   )
 1: (9)
This guarantees that the second term of condition (8) is positive, such that the re-
14For technical simplicity, we assume that having reported will not lower the cost of trial. Lawsuits must
be begun from scratch, even if rm 2 has previously reported to the AA. This is justied, as presenting
evidence to a judge is a dierent task than providing evidence to the AA.
11quirement that the court is more likely to err than the AA is fullled. If the trial cost is
too large, then rm 2 would also report in the trial setting, in an attempt to avoid the
litigation expense. Above, we implicitly assumed that rm 2 will always go to trial if it
can. In the appendix, it is shown that this is always true if rm 2 only reports when
private trials are not possible, that is c 2 [cAC
T ;cAC
NT], whose existence is guaranteed by
 < AC
R . This also guarantees the implicit assumption above that the denominator of
the right-hand side of condition (7) will be positive. Then Lemma 1 summarizes how the
reporting of anticompetitive actions depends on the possibility of private trial.
Lemma 1. If  < AC
R , there exists an interval [cAC
T ;cAC
NT] in which rm 2 goes to trial if
the legal setting so allows and reports information only if it cannot go to trial.
The critical value AC
R decreases with , , ,  and  and is ambiguously aected by .
The lemma has the following intuitive explanation: If the error spread is large, then
rm 2 will have a strong incentive to avoid trial. The cost of reporting c that rm 2 is
willing to bear in order to avoid trial increases with . This eect is especially strong when
the cost of going to trial is large. If it is too large, then rm 2 might even report if the
court is as accurate as the AA. This happens only at a cost multiplier strictly larger than
one because the AA reacts to information only with a probability smaller than one. If the
eectiveness of reporting increases, this condition is less likely to be fullled, because it
aects the condition for reporting more in the trial setting; in both legal settings is the
condition for reporting aected by the fact that the likelihood of prosecution is increased,
in the trials setting the condition is additionally aected by the potential avoidance of
litigation costs.
2.2.2 Procompetitive actions
The rst best for procompetitive actions requires that rm 2 does not report information,
as this would be falsied information about non-existent infringements and would result
in higher probabilities of false conviction. We will show that the trial possibility might
crowd out false reported information; thus, the trial option might have a positive eect
on the number of type I enforcement errors. The analysis of the no-trial setting is very
similar to the case of anticompetitive actions, except that the action is prosecuted with
probability  rather than 1  (given an investigation) and  rather than 1  (given
a trial). The ex-ante value of reporting a procompetitive action (denoted with superscript
PC) in the no-trial setting is therefore given by
V PC
NT;R =
( + (1   )) D
1    ((1   ) + (1   )(1   ))cD







1   (1   )
(11)
12for not reporting. As was the case with anticompetitive actions, the reporting decision
only becomes relevant when the AA has not prosecuted the action based on its own
information. Consequently, reporting is optimal for rm 2 if
(1   )














which is equivalent to
c 
(1   )
(1    + (1   )(1   ))(1   (1   ))
 cPC
NT: (13)
Under the trial system, rm 2 would, under the assumption that is goes to trial, report







A necessary condition for reporting in the trial setting is that the left-hand side must
be negative, as the right-hand side is always negative, which is guaranteed if
  1 +




the sucient condition is c > cPC
T , which is dened by fullling condition (14) with
equality. It should be noted that the reverse condition  > PC
R is a sucient condition
for not reporting; this is the state in which we are interested. Here, rm 2 only reports
if the cost of reporting is great enough. This is the case because the cost of suing is high
( large) and positively related to the cost of reporting. Thus, it is important for rm 2
to avoid trial when the reporting cost is high. The two states - reporting when trials are
not possible (c  cPC
NT) and not reporting when trials are possible ( > PC
R or  < PC
R
together with c  cPC
T ) - must be compatible with each other; and moreover, going to trial
must be optimal for rm 2. In the appendix it is demonstrated that this can only be the
case for  > PC
R ; however, is then fullled for all c < cPC
NT. Lemma 2 concludes:
Lemma 2. For   PC
R , there exsits a set [0;cPC
NT] in which rm 2 goes to trial over
procompetitive actions if allowed to do so and reports information only if it cannot sue.
The condition is fullled for all  > 1 if  is small enough. Otherwise the critical value
PC
R increases with , ,  and decreases with .
Here, reporting in the no-trial setting only requires a large error spread. If the spread is
small, rm 2 will prefer to avoid the cost of trial and will accept the lower probability of
conviction. However, if the error spread is large, going to trial will be protable because
the probability of desistance by a court decision is much higher. A high trial costs is
also a sucient condition. As for anticompetitive actions, the condition is less likely to
13be fullled if reporting becomes more eective, because its eect in the trial setting is
stronger as litigation costs are saved.
3 Anticompetitive actions
3.1 Desistance of anticompetitive actions
One of the goals of the AA is to halt existing violations. We are interested in the question
of whether introducing private suits for damages increases or decreases desistance. In our
model, this is straightforward. We restrict our analysis to the case of Lemma 1, in which
rm 2 reports only if the legal setting does not allow stand-alone trials. By assumption, de-
sistance of the violation occurs whenever either public or private prosecution is successful.
This is an important assumption, as it implies that suing and reporting are substitutable
strategies for rm 2. The welfare eects of desistance have to be recursively calculated,
since an unsuccessful prosecution precludes possible prosecution in future periods. We
assume that the action causes a welfare harm of size  W0 per period. Thus, the total




(1   )( + (1   ))W0




T = (1   )W0 + (1   )(1   )W0 (17)
for the two legal regimes. Not allowing trials is thus a better strategy for the desistance
antitrust violations if
  1 +
(1   )(1   )(1   )
(1   (1   )(1   ))
 AC
Des; (18)
that is, if the error spread is large enough. Otherwise, with high probability, the court
decision will be correct and furthermore will be accomplished with certainty in the current
period, making private trial a strong enforcement mechanism. The condition is more easily
fullled if  increases, because then the eect of reporting is great, thus strengthening
public enforcement. It is more easily fullled for large , as then trials become less
important. For larger , public prosecution also dominates, as an increase in the error
probability is by the factor  > 1 more harmful for private prosecution. Finally, it is more
easily fullled if the discount factor is high, since then desistance in future periods will
not imply too great of a loss in comparison to current desistance. Lemma 3 concludes:
Lemma 3. Given c 2 [cAC
T ;cAC
NT], the desistance of anticompetitive actions is higher with-
out private trials only if the error probability spread is large enough. The critical value
AC
Des decreases with , , and .
Note that the conditions for more reporting and higher desistance in the non-trial setting
require moving in opposite directions with regard to the accuracy spread . However, they
14can be simultaneously fullled if
 
1    + (1   )
(1   )((1   )(1   )(1   ) + (1   (1   )(1   )))
 2; (19)
where 2 is more restrictive then 1.
Proposition 1. Desistance of anticompetitive actions can decrease through the introduc-
tion of private trials if AC
R    AC
Des. This interval exists if   2.
Reversal of the reasoning that predominates in previous literature on type II errors
requires that the error spread is neither too large (in which case information provision
would be identical in both trial and no-trial setting) nor too small (whereby the additional
enforcement eects from reporting would not outweigh the enforcement eects from private
trials). This follows quite naturally. On the one hand, if the courts are as accurate as
the bureaucracy, then we should expect that trials will improve enforcement: the courts
act with certainty in a given period on evidence by a injured party, whereas the AA will
only react with a probability smaller than one. On the other hand, if the error spread is
too large, then the trial option makes no dierence, because rm 2 will expect that the
court will err with high probability and will therefore provide information to the AA. In
addition, it is necessary that  be small enough, because otherwise reporting will always
be a less costly alternative to suing. The stronger the eect of reporting, the smaller the
cost of trial can be for which the novel eects still hold.
3.2 Deterrence of anticompetitive actions
The crowding-out of useful information provided to the AA by the introduction of pri-
vate trials will harm deterrence if it osets the gain in deterrence resulting from the
private damages the violator expects to pay from stand-alone private trials. Independent
of whether private trials are possible or not, rm 1 will base its decision of whether to
undertake the harmful action by comparing expected prots with expected nes. The rm
will additionally take into consideration that it cannot be prosecuted in periods following
a false acquittal. Assume that rm 2 will invest in gathering evidence only if it can not
sue privately, as described in Lemma 1. Then, the critical prot levels above which rm
1 will undertake the anticompetitive action are given by
  (1   )
(1   )(1 + )D + (1   )(1   )(1 + c)D
1   (1   ( + (1   )))
 AC
T (20)
if private trials are possible and
  (1   )
( + (1   ))(1   )(1 + )D
1   (1   ( + (1   )))
 AC
NT (21)
otherwise. In each of these equations, the left-hand side reects the per-period prot,
the numerator of the right-hand side reects the expected costs (which remain constant
over all periods), and the denominator reects the prot multiplier resulting from the
15dynamic structure of the game.15 Comparison of the two critical levels yields a condition
under which the no-trial setting deters more violations than the trial setting:
  1 +
(1   )(1   (1   ( + (1   ))))((1 + c)   (1 + )(1   ))




Lemma 4. Given c 2 [cAC
T ;cAC
NT], the deterrence of anticompetitive actions is higher with-
out private trials only if the error probability spread is large enough. The critical value
AC
Det decreases with , , ,  and  and increases with  and c.
As is for desistance the case, the condition for greater deterrence imposes requirements
on  in contrast to the condition for more reporting. However it can be seen, that the
two conditions are compatible with each other, as the last product in the numerator of
condition (22) becomes negative if the ne multiplier  is large enough, implying that
the condition for greater deterrence of anticompetitive actions absent of the possibility of





is dened by , such that AC
R = AC
Det.
Proposition 2. Deterrence of anticompetitive actions decrease through the introduction
of private trials if AC
R    AC




The section above has argued that there is some parameter space in which an injured rm
that is informed about the illegality of an action only reports the breach to the correspond-
ing authority if it cannot sue directly. The resulting lower probability of prosecution can
dominate the additional probability of prosecution in a private trial. Moreover, the lower
probability of a ne can dominate the expected damage payment, such that deterrence
decreases. But is this in fact a relevant case or is it just a theoretical possibility? With
the help of a numerical example, this subsection illustrates that all specied conditions are
likely to be fullled for a realistic selection of parameters. In accordance with Harrington
(2006), we assume that the AA is unlikely to err (low ) and has only a low probability
of initial evidence (low ). The ne multiplier corresponds to treble damages. This is
common in the US, where public prosecution and hence nes play only a small role. The
factor  assumes that legal fees are 50% of the cost of providing evidence, and  = 0:2




Det as a function of , assuming numerical values as described in
Table 1.
15The costs remain identical due to the non-cumulative nature of nes and damage payment, a common
assumption in economic theory. Some of the exceptions we are aware of are Motchenkova (2004) in









Table 1: The numerical values of the example.
Notice that the values guarantee the restrictions on conditions (19) and (22). With the
numerical value of  = 0:05, it is reasonable to restrict the error spread to values  < 10,
because otherwise the court would commit fewer errors by ipping a coin. The rst graph
shows the existence of an interval in which desistance of anticompetitive actions decreases
as a result of the trial option. As has been proven above, both critical values decrease with
. The length of the interval increases for the given values. As  increases, the constraint
requiring more reporting in the absence of trials drops, but only moderately, while the
restriction of greater desistance falls more dramatically. For  = 1 rm 2 only reports if
















Figure 2: The numerical example for desistance of anticompetitive actions
With regard to deterrence, we additionally require a value for the reporting cost c.
Remember, however, that c must be in the interval [cAC
T ;cAC
NT]. The critical value AC
Det
increases with c. We consider the case of the maximum value of the cost, c = cAC
NT, which
is thus the strictest case possible. Note that for lower values of c the parameter space
17might increase. As Figure 3 depicts, the interval in question does not exist for every value
of . In the numerical example, AC
R and AC
Det cannot be fullled simultaneously if  is too
small. However AC
Det drops sharply while AC
R falls only moderately as  increases. The
conditions can here be simultaneously fullled if  & 0:18. For  = 1, the court can be
between two and ve times as erroneous as the AA for the described eect to hold.
We believe the identied parameter space to be a strong indicator that the eects of trials
dier from what is commonly believed. These eects must be reconsidered in light of the
















Figure 3: The numerical example for deterrence of anticompetitive actions
4 Procompetitive actions
4.1 Desistance of procompetitive actions
Which legal system better avoids type I errors? Remember that the condition   PC
R
together with c  cPC
NT states the conditions under which there will only be reporting (i.e.,
manipulation of the AA) in the no-trial setting. If this condition is fullled, there will
be more reports in the absence of the private possibility to sue. In the no-trials setting
procompetitive actions are prosecuted with probability +(1 ), and with the same
probability in future periods should the AA not investigate. In the trial setting, actions
are wrongfully prosecuted with probability  + (1   ) and zero probability in future
periods by both the AA and the courts. A simple comparison shows that for  > 1 the
value of welfare loss due to desistance is always higher when private trials are possible.
Proposition 3. Welfare losses through false convictions increases as a result of the in-
18troduction of private trials if courts are more erroneous than the AA even when harmful
reporting is crowded out.
Here, the prevailing theory regarding the eect of private antitrust enforcement on pro-
competitive actions holds: Such actions are less likely to cease, as McAfee et al. (2008)
and Calcagno (2012) predict. Their result cannot be qualied by introducing a reporting
stage, since an action has a higher probability of being falsely convicted in private prosecu-
tion. Thus, desistance is increased when weight is shifted from public to (more erroneous
private prosecution) and additionally taken with higher probability in the same period.
However, this result arises not because the condition for greater desistance opposes the
condition for more reporting, but rather directly from the assumption that the court is
more erroneous.
4.2 Deterrence of procompetitive actions
We now consider what happens to the deterrence of procompetitive actions when rm 2
only reports in the no-trial setting. In such a situation, the additional deterrent eect of
private trials is ambiguous. Analogous to the anticompetitive case, critical prot levels
are given by
  (1   )
(1 + )( + (1   ))D
1   (1   (1   )( + (1   )))
 PC
NT; (23)
  (1   )
(1 + )D + (1   )(1 + c)D
1   (1   (1   )( + (1   )(1   ))
 PC
T : (24)
Type I errors in deterrence are higher without the possibility of private trials whenever
the critical threshold is lower in the trial setting than in the no-trial setting. That is if
  1 +
(1 + )((1   )(1   ) + (1   ))   (1 + c)(1   (1   (1   )( + (1   ))))




Lemma 5. Given c 2 [0;cPC
NT], private trials decrease the deterrence of procompetitive
actions, if   PC
Det. The critical value PC
Det increases with , , ,  and  and decreases
with c and .
This condition imposes a restriction on  directionally opposed to the necessary con-
dition for more reporting in the no-trial setting. It should be noted, however, that the
critical value for deterrence increases with the ne multiplier. Thus the two conditions




is dened by equalizing PC
R and
PC
Det. From this follows the next proposition:
19Proposition 4. Deterrence of procompetitive actions decreases as a result of the intro-
duction of private trials if PC
Det    PC
R . This interval exists if   
PC
.
The results from McAfee et al. (2008) and Calcagno (2012) can be reversed for the
deterrence of procompetitive actions, but cannot be reversed for the desistance. The
probability of prosecution cannot decrease through the introduction of private trials, but
the legal consequences (namely, the total ne, which only matters for deterrence but not
for desistance) can become less severe when private trials are possible. Note that this
result relies on the fact that the AA does not follow up with nes after a private trial,
which is in accordance with real-world practice.
4.3 Numerical example
Assume that the same parameters hold as in the example for anticompetitive actions.
Remember that desistance of procompetitive actions can never be lower with the private
trial option, even when false reports are crowded out through trials. Deterrence of pro-
competitive actions can decrease through the the implementation of the trial option as
described above. Figure 4 depicts the conditions specied by PC
R and PC
Det. As has been
shown above, PC
Det is slackened and PC
R tightens as  increases. Again, we must consider
the limitations of c as specied above, since this aects the value of PC
Det. The strictest
possible case is again the maximum c = cPC
NT as PC
Det decreases with c. With this value,
deterrence can only decrease with the private trials option if  . 0:95. For an intermediate
value of  = 0:5 the court may be as much as three times as likely to commit an error as
the AA in order for the described eect to occur. Thus, it is highly plausible that private
trials would in fact decrease the deterrence of procompetitive actions.
5 Conclusion
The question of the welfare eects of private antitrust trials is currently hotly debated,
both in academia and among practitioners. Previous research has established clear pre-
dictions about the types of errors we should expect to increase and decrease with the
implementation of private trials. Allowing for the communication of evidence from private
parties to the AA puts these results into question. Under certain parameter constellations,
(some of) the results are reversed. The numerical illustrations show that for reasonable
quantitative assumptions, the reversal of the eects is quite likely to occur. Of course,
a general policy recommendation cannot very well be derived from our results. How-
ever, they do indicate that not only the total eect on welfare, but also that the eects
decomposed on error types are ambiguous. It is essentially an empirical question as to
which type of error increases and which decreases. From a theoretical perspective, both
are equally possible, depending on whether the trial possibility crowds out cooperation
between private parties and the AA, and on whether this can outweigh the direct eects.
















Figure 4: The numerical example for deterrence of procompetitive actions
drawn from this paper. Consider the parameter , which measures the dierence in error
probabilities between the bureaucracy and the judicial system. If this variable is either
very small or very large, our analysis does not provide new insights, and errors persist as
previously determined. This is somewhat at odds with the discussion of Shleifer (2010),
who shows that regulation is superior to litigation if the bureaucracy is more eective
than the courts are ( high). However, this conundrum can be resolved. Consider the
anticompetitive case for an illustration. In accordance with Shleifer (2010), in our model
regulation is superior to litigation if the court is erroneous (condition (18)). However, ef-
fective regulation in our model also requires input from a private party, that it would not
provide if the judicial system were suciently accurate (condition (7)). Thus, an ecient
legal system weakens the eciency of regulation. This is an important issue that might
be interesting to generalize beyond the context of antitrust enforcement. It is an inter-
esting question, both theoretically and empirically, whether and how much the quality
of a bureaucracy is degraded by the availability of ecient litigation, since contributions
to public enforcement become less necessary from an individual perspective. The opti-
mality of regulation or litigation cannot be determined by a simple comparison; rather it
is aected by interaction between the two dierent means of law enforcement. Allowing
litigation can lead to an underinvestment problem (see Shavell (1997)), which is mitigated
when parties can only enforce their rights in collaboration with a regulator.
21Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Above it was shown that there exists an cost interval within which rm 2 only reports in
the trial setting if   AC
R , where it was implicitly assumed that rm 2 goes to trial if the
legal setting allows to do so. We will now show that this is the case for all relevant cases.
Assume that the AA did not investigate an action. Then rm 2 has the choice of either
suing rm 1 or waiting for an investigation from AA in a following period (in which it will
report as long a c < cAC





  cD  V AC
NT;R: (26)













LHS as the  equalizing the left-hand side to zero (where it is positive if  is
below the critical value) and AC
RHS as the  equalizing the right-hand side to zero (where






(1   )(1   ) + (1   (1   )(1   ))
(1    + (1   )
(28)
it holds that AC
LHS > AC
R > AC
RHS and the inverse direction otherwise. In the rst case
the condition is obviously fullled without further constraints for  < AC
LHS, because the
LHS is positive and the RHS is positive. For AC
LHS <  < AC
R rm 2 goes to trial only
if c > cAC
S , which is dened to equalize the trial condition. Further it can be shown that
cAC
S < cAC
T holds, such that for all costs for which rm 2 only reports absent of the trial
possibility it also sues if it can. In the second case the condition is fullled without further
constraints for  < RHS, as again the LHS is positive while the RHS is negative. For
AC
RHS <  < AC
R rm 2 goes only to trial if c < ~ cAC
S . However, this is no further constraint
because cAC
S > cAC
NT is implied by  > AC
R . This concludes that suing is always optimal
in the cases where reporting is only optimal if trial is not allowed. This is summarized in
Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2





  (1   )cD  V PC
NT;R; (29)
which is equivalent to
cD

(1   )(1   (1   )(1   ))   (1    + (1   )(1   ))

(1   )
 D((1   (1   )(1   ))   ( + (1   ))):
(30)
The right-hand side is for all  > 1 positive. Thus rm 2 goes to trial if either the
left-hand side is negative, that is if
  1 +
(1   )(1   (1   )(1   ))   (1    + (1   )(1   ))
(1   (1   )(1   ))
 PC
T ; (31)
or if the LHS is positive and if c < cPC
S , where cPC
S is dened by fullling condition (30)
with equality. Remember that we are looking for a condition where rm 2 goes to trial,
but does not report to the AA. Notice rst, that PC
T > PC
R holds. Thus not reporting
and trial are optimal, if either  < PC
R and cPC
T < c < cPC
S , or if  > PC
T , or nally, if
PC
R <  < PC
T together with c  cPC
S holds. The rst case can be excluded as cPC
T < cPC
S
is not compatible with  < PC
R . Finally, for  > PC
R it holds that cPC
NT < cPC
S , thus for all
relevant cases, that is reporting in the NT setting only, rm 2 will also go to trial. Lemma
2 concludes this analysis.
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